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Aesthetics and the End of Civilization 
Franeis Spa�hon 
I 
In June 1993 a new association for the study of aesthetics was inaugurated in Sydney, 
Ausrralia.1 TIUs might seem a strange time for such a move. Aesthetics, the theory of 
beauty and the fine arts, has seldom been much esteemed or studied in the English­
speaking world, and in recent years it has been partially eclipsed by more fashionable 
studies. However, if an association for aesthetics is to be founded at all in these 
unpropitious times, the city of Sydney is certainly a good place for it. For a quarter of a 
century the new Sydney Opera House has been famous as one of the world's most 
remarkable buildings, and the story of its origin will introduce my present copic. 
The rrue history of the Sydney Opera House is intricate and concroversial. The myth 
that the world knows, which is what concerns us here, is roughly as follows. A 
conspicuous site was chosen for a new concert hall., and an international competition was 
announced for its design. The complex practical requirements the building was to fulfil 
were specified in detail, in accordance with the best prevailing practice for such 
competitions. Three internationally eminent members of the architectural profession, 
together with a distinguished local architect, served as judges. There were over two 
hundred entries. The winning design paid no attention to the stipulated practical 
requirements, but was chosen on che basis of a rough drawing of an overall shape for the 
proposed complex. Admittedly, given the location, the quality of the silhouette was a 
primary concern; even so, the selection procedure was something of a scandal, and the 
practical consequences were unfortunate. It is as if the judges had been overwhelmed by 
what they referred to as the "striking architectural composition." A5 it turned out, the 
original archicect had no idea how his proposal could be carried through; the practical 
demands could not be fully accommodated; the roofs as drawn could not be constructed, 
and shells of a simpler curvature had to be substituted. But in the end, after a lot of time 
and money and grief, in the words of the account I am following "the exterior of the 
building as designed by Utzon was completed, and that is what people see and admire and 
remember. "2 
It was precisely this undisputed power of certain images to be "seen and admired and 
remembered" that the young Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten had in mind when he 
invented the term and topic of aesthetics in 1735.3 The science of logic had long existed 
to provide a critique of cogency in arguments; why should there not be a comparable 
science to founcil the critique of the imagery that formed the substance of poems and 
other works of art? What is it about the mind that makes it able and willing to generate 
and appreciate images capable of commanding universal recognition, borne by travel 
supplements and posters to the far ends of the earth, so that the silhouette of the Opera 
House says "Sydney" everywhere as clearly as the Parthenon says" Athens'' and the Taj 
Mahal says "Agra"? 
What the story of the Opera House clearly shows is not merely the allure of beauty, 
but its compelling power. What was special about the design was not its distinctiveness 
and recognizability, but the sheer overwhelming beauty of which the original sketches 
held the promise and the finished building was the fulfillment, the authority with which 
it compelled and continues to compel admiration and respect. In all the tangle of political 
and economic motivations that surrounded the project from beginning to end, what 
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stands out is thac the imagined and perceived quality of a design imposed itself as an 
imperative, to which imtx>rtant professional concerns must be sacrificed and important 
public resources devoted. 
The new discipline that Baumgarten proposed was made rnto a recognized part of 
systematic philosophy by lmmanuel Kane. He founded it , not on the charm of pleasing 
sights and sounds,, but on this distinctive value of beauty, the imputed necessity of the 
admiration and delight it evolces. le is this authority that aesthetics has to explore and 
explain. Kant himself, in a profoundly original move that escapes many of his readers, 
split this authoritativeness of beauty into two. In the sphere of artistic and perceptual 
beauty, it manifests itself only as the delighted cognition of the necessity of a necessary 
pleasure. Practical coerciveness is confined co the moral law within us, the beauty of 
which evoles that idealistic devotion which Kant calls the "se:nse of duty."'4 It was left 
for Mik.el Dufrenne two centuries later to allow a sort of dynamic force to the recognition 
of aesthetic beauty, which compels artists to bring their designs co fruition, and entices 
the organizers of architectural competitions to establish a place for those designs in the 
economic world. s 
However it is robe described and explained, it is the recognition of the compelling 
force that beauty exercises on human minds that gives aesthetics its place in philosophy. 
That means that aesthetics must be grounded in axiology, the general theory of values, 
which must itself be a chief and central part of the philosophy of action. le is a long time 
since philosophers in the English-spealcing world gave much serious thought to this, but 
in the early days of philosophy it was an important theme. What are the relationships, 
philosophers wondered, between enjoyability, charm, utility, fittingness, beauty, good� 
ness, rightness, lawfulness, love? What are the defensible and distinguishable reasons we 
as philosophers can give for seelcing and avoiding, cherishing and shunning? These were 
once pressing questions for philosophers, but nowadays we avoid them, so that aesthetics 
ane ethics ali.lce are separately adrift in an ocean of vagueness and evasion. 
Whatever our modem delinquencies in this area, aesthetics remains in principle that 
branch of philosophy that must identify and anatomize whatever area of value it is of 
whose power the Sydney Opera House stands as an inescapable reminder. Lacking the 
will and the intellectual resources to take this approach, however, many recent 
philosophers tum to a task more amenable to their preferred methods. Whatever the 
nature and source of therr power over our senses and minds, beautiful buildings are built 
for reasons, and architectural competitions lead to the formulation and defence of 
judgments. Such reasons and judgments belong to a domain of critical discourse, the 
logic of which can be observed and explored. And logic, many of us feel, is what 
philosophy really comes down to. So aesthetics as generally practiced does not attempt 
general value theory, but confines itself to the logic of critical discourse, the meaning and 
justification of the things people say when they criticize those kinds and aspects of human 
production in which aesthetic value seems to play a dominant part.6 
Aesthetics, then, tends to turn into the philosophy of art and art criticism. But when 
we look at what people mostly write about in aesthetics, we cannot help noticing that 
the preferred terrain is not art as a whole, the generality of artistic production, but the 
fine arts in their most notable manifestations, as exemplified by masterpieces and 
enshrined in museums. Aesthetics in practice is a philosophy of the exceptional rather 
than of the normal. In this, aesthetics differs markedly from ethics and the philosophy 
of science, in which heroic actions and great discoveries play no great part. Why is 
aesthetics different? 
The obvious answer is that it is in the greatest masterpieces of art that the power of 3
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beauty is really compelling. But this obvious answer is not available to an aesthetics that 
has abandoned direct concern with the theory of value. So we are left to ask, given the 
concern of aesthetics with criticism and irs objects, what it is that is so exceptional about 
the exceptional. 
At first sight, the answer seems quite straightforward. The ans are skilled activities. 
In any sphere of activity some people do better than others: they find the activity more 
congenial, master the techniques sooner, grasp the principles, acquire knacks, work 
harder and with more self.confidence or self.criticism. Hundreds of thousands of 
children play ice hockey, but there are only a few teams in the National Hockey League, 
and of the players who make it to that league only a dozen or two are stars and maybe 
three are superstars. Their prowess is manifest and no one disputes it, even though the 
rules and skills and institutions in relation to which alone that prowess can exist are 
entirely artificial. and to a great extent accidental and arbitrary. Something like this must 
be the norm for the use and development of complex skills in all highly structured and 
stable fields of activity. So it is only to be expected that "elitist" values should be 
enshrined in art museums and literary canons. It could hardly be otherwise. All the 
inquirer has to do is to explain the actual dialectics of the development and appreciation 
of sk.illls, and the values involved, together with the concrete particularities in which 
those dialectics are from time co time realized. 
The existence of an art of geniuses and masterpieces and great traditions is the 
inevitable outcome of the rhythms of work, energy, ability, education and cooperation 
in any society that aims to improve itself, rather than simply co maintain itself. Aesthetics 
has co include, as a distinctive part, the study of the standards and aspirations involved 
in those rhythms: in effect, the development of a reflective criticism in relation co the 
highest art. The problem is not why these supreme achievements should exist and be 
recognized, but why they should have figured so largely in our theories. 
It is here that misgivings arise. Historians remind us that art museums, despite their 
claim to be shrines of spiritual achievement, are actually the repositories of artistic loot 
accumulated by predatory courts and capitalists, signs of power and affluence flaunted 
philanthropically in the fawning faces of the weak and humble. Aesthetics historically 
came into effective existence co contruct an idealistic ideology capable of cloaking what 
was originally nothing but naked greed. High art was the art favored by the rich and 
powerful; aestheticians functioned as their court intellectuals, providing their acquisi­
tions with forged documents of spiritual provenance. Aesthetics, as it has been practiced, 
stands guilty of assigning superior value co whatever happens to be preferred by a socially 
or politically privileged class. 
The position just seated is familiar and persuasive. But it is not a complete alternative 
to the view that acknowledges the dynamics of achievemenL The paintings that 
millionaires buy would not confirm the prestige of their purchasers unless their value had 
already been established on other grounds. More fundamentally, a bank could not 
establish its solidity by spending millions of dollars on a painting unless there was a 
consensus, among those who were meant to be impressed, that the aesthetic value the 
best paintings have is a kind of value on which it is sometimes justifiable co put a very 
high price. What the facts of museum and market do seem co explain is why aesthetics 
devotes such a high proportion of its discourse to what elites happen to prefer. 
Aesthetics, no less than art, depends directly and indirectly on the patronage of the rich 
and the great. 
In sum, what appears in our art histories, and by implication in much writing on the 
philosophy of art, is simply the best work around, the work of those deservedly chosen 
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and trained and encouraged and criticized and eventually esteemed. lbac is true even if 
the fact that only the rich and IX>Werful can command such abilities means that the besr 
talent is warped in directions that the rich and powerful dicta 'te or encourage, and even 
if the worth of achievement becomes exchange value in a dubious market. 
II 
Such are the explanations I used to accept of why aesthetics has traditionally concentrated 
so heavily on the narrow range of artistic practice identified as the fine ans, and on the 
supreme achievements in chose arts. Lately, though, I have come to chink of these 
explanations as inadequate. The very idea of the fine arts, a restricted range of"high" art 
practice in which alone supreme efforts are to be made and supreme achievements 
recognized and rewarded, seems to me now to be bound up with the phenomenon of 
empire, by which I mean the situation in which a number of socio,cultural units are bound 
together in an administrative unity without losing their vital identity. Such a unity exists 
primarily as an information system. In the great civilizations, notably the Indian and the 
Sino.-Japanese as well as the GreCCYRornan and its successors, we find an officially 
recognized high art that is associated not only with the central organization of the political 
power but, more closely and relevantly, with an educational system into which those are 
coopted who are to be concerned with the civilization as a whole. If one is to move out of 
one·'s village one goes to a school in which one is indoctrinated in what passes current 
throughout the empire; and this indoctrination includes a recognized music and literature, 
which does not express the lived reality of any specific local or ethnic identity, but passes 
current everywhere. Thus in India the classical dance theatre, of which the principles were 
set out in the NatyashastTa about two thousand years ago, is politically and culturally 
enshrined not as one set of dance forms among others, but as the kind of dance that is 
proper to the spiritual and intellectual system that is identified with India as India. In 
comparison with this, all other dances indigenous to the sub,continent are relegated to the 
status of ethnic or folk practice and either excluded from the educational system or taught 
as marginal or exotic. 
lbe way this ideological pattern worlcs in the United States today has been somewhat 
unselfconsciously expounded by E. D. Hirsch Jr. and his colleagues in their work on 
"culturalliteracy": there are a lot of things, they point out, that all Americans need to know 
before they can read and understand a newspaper or take part in a polite conversation, and 
without which they cannot talce part effectively in public life but are confined to relatively 
menial employment in a narrow sphere. 7 What moves me to call Hirsch's exposition 
"unselfconscious" is that he writes as if the wider sphere into which cultural literacy is the 
initiation were an intrinsically superior reality, rather than merely what it more straight, 
forwardly is, a domain of publ ic mobility and potential power of which the public schools 
are official doorkeepers. 
Empire is commonly presented in terms of imperialism, a Hobbesian "restless desire of 
power after power" in which strong political organizations seek to dominate and incorpo­
rate others. In these terms, empire is defined by relations of dominance and exploitation 
between peoples of grossly unequal power who remain essentially separate from each 
other, unified at best by the bureaucratic control of the dominant group. "High" arts are 
accordingly taken to be the arts of the dominant ethnic group, their prestige simply 
manifesting the oppressive power of that group. My argument here is that these relations 
of domination, which have so preoccupied us lately, are no more significant than the 
internal structure of an empire or a civilization as an information system, a system of 
5
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educational and culrural centralization that articulates the actual social functioning of 
the empire as such and in which racial and ethnic differentiation play no essential part. 
In an imperial civilization, the high an is the an that is integral to the educational 
system that feeds and defines the mandarinate, the body of those whose common 
schooling makes them eligible to participate in public affairs, even though thac art may 
itself not be promoted formally by the educational institutions. It should be obvious that 
such an educational system cannot be open to all members of an ethnically dominant 
group as such, and cannot accordingly be identified with the artistic expression of that 
group; while the whole point of the educational system is that it is open co the talents of 
anyone, of whatever ethnic background, within the imperial boundaries, who by the 
same coken form the proper public for the high arts of the empire and may take part in 
their practice. 
The association of High Art with the mandarinate is dearly visible in Hume's 1759 
essay "On the Standard of Taste." The standard, he cells us, is che consensus of the best 
judges. But when we look closely at who these authoritative judges are, they tum out to 
be people who have precisely the sympathetic sensitivity, scrupulous impartiality, and 
discriminating care that we look for in people who are to take responsible positions in law 
or bureaucracy. The close connection between high art and the e,ducational system also 
appears in Hume's essay, though less explicitly. The canonical works whose admitted 
excellence testifies to the durability of the alleged standard are such as the Iliad, which 
had been the staple of the schools of ancient Greece, the Aeneid of Virgil, which 
permanently acquired similar standing in Roman schools in its au1Chor's lifetime, and the 
handful of Athenian tragedies selected and edited for school use by the educational 
bureaucracy of Byzantium. Quite generally, it seems, the high arts around which the 
concept of the fine ans was being articulated in Hume's day were not in the firsr instance 
those preferred by the artistically creative community or by wielders of the central 
political power, but those selected and endorsed by the educational system that gave the 
civilization in question a semblance of intellectual coherence and a common set of 
methods and references to orient itself by. And a key point for my argument here is that 
such systems, whatever the actual forces that shape them, do purport to be systems of 
education, not of indoctrination, and accordingly co discover rather than to decree the 
value of what they teach. 
In the days of Hume and Kant, European civilization was strongly unified by its 
educational system, centred on the international university network of Christendom 
through which ideas and teachers circulated. In the next century, the growth of the exact 
sciences and the conscious development of critical standards called "the Enlighten� 
ment" caused that network to begin its expansion into the articulation of something like 
a world system, linked to a shadowy order that has some of the features of a world cultural 
empire. Modem science, and co a lesser extent modem technology, though in.separable 
from an elaborate educational system with its associated disciplines of thought and 
procedure, are no longer closely linked co any living culture other than their own. And 
this moving out into the world is accompanied by a. comparable movement in the arts; 
the winner of a piano competition or a ballet competition nowadays may come from 
anywhere in the world.8 But though the worldwide authority of science rests on 
theoretical coherence and experimental confirmation, the irlternational spread of art 
fonns rooted in European traditions has no visible ground other than the internal 
cohesion of the educational system that is centred on universities of the sort in which 
science is native. High art is art chat happens to be internationally institutionalized by 
way of an educational system that has no competitors, because it is the only established 
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vehicle of the sci.ence that underpins the technology that has made itself everywhere 
indispensable. And the discipline of aesthetics, as ic has originated and grown, is 
indigenous to that educational system and nowhere else. A conference in Brockport can 
be addressed by an aesthetician from Australia, or Russia, or Japan, or Canada, without 
anyone noticing the difference; the only kind of speaker who would be exotic would be 
one from outside the worldwide university system. 
This final cultural empire is what Hegel's absolute idealism already divined. His 
system articulated a process whereby research science and scientific hitscory would 
inevitably, by their own impetus, make all their competitors irrelevant, so that a world 
cultlllral community would attain unassailable authority. The imaginative expression of 
this complex spiritual unity would be world art; it was the task of the philosophy of art 
to articulate this development and establish the hierarchy of fine art within the hierarchy 
of the manifestations of mind. At least, that would have been its task, if Hegel had not 
kindly carried it out already. 
Today's international order, then, consists of a sort of super-imperial hierarchy 
superimposed on or superseding all other imperial systems, articulated by an interna­
tional cultural and educational system that carries along with it its own high art with its 
own procedures and canons; and chis, in the end, is what aesthetics has in view and 
supports. This system has received surprisingly little public attention, partly because it 
was obscured for a long time by Marxism and its variants, which preferred to postulate 
and evaluate socio-economic mechanisms that kept the system going rather than 
examine the actual worbng of the educational complex itself. 
Because the significance of empire as an informational system rather than as 
institutionalized oppression is missed, all cultural phenomena risk being misconstrued. 
Such phenomena need to be understood, in the first instance, in terms of their precise 
relationship to the flow of information, not merely diagnosed as oppressing or oppressed. 
Ethnic and imperial traditions of training, practice, and reception interact in subtle ways 
that insistence on the brutal dualisms of power falsifies, and every artistic phenomenon 
will be related in its own way to the historical specifics of these interactions. 
III 
This discourse began by saying what a fit emblem the Sydney Opera House was of the 
necessity of aesthetics, as the philosophical discipline evoked by the compelling force of 
the values of beauty. It is now time to point to what we surely cannot have forgotten, that 
the actual function for which that building complex was called into existence was at least 
nominally to be an opera house, and actually and primarily to be a symphonic hall, the 
locus for public concerts of orchestral music. And it would surprise me to learn that the 
performances put on there were predominantly the outcome of the musical traditions 
and genius of Australia, any more than the works performed in the symphony hall of my 
own city of Toronto are predominantly Canadian. The works played and heard in such 
places mostly belong to the high art of the international civilization. Opera itself in its 
original form was not the natural flowering of a local culture, but was invented to realise 
the supposed ideals and methods of the most prestigious art form to which European 
civilization looked back, Athenian tragedy (the crucial cultural significance of which 
Plato and Aristotle had in their separate ways emphasized, and thus ensured for it a 
permanent place in the educational consciousness of the successor civilization). In its 
development, opera became a sort of potlatch, the extravagant art in which civic or regal 
pride could be invested, and in which the lack of any specifically local character is a point 
7
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of honor. Insrrumenral music, as principally exemplified by Beethoven, became insepa­
rable from the new nineteenth-century metropoliran institution of the subscription 
concert, the cultural shrine for the new class of educated middle-class functionaries 
whose informed taste stood for their commitment to the national and international order 
as opposed to the festivities of their fellow townspeople. 9The Sydney Opera House, then, 
stands not only for the power of beauty, but for the implicit authority of the fine arts and 
the world-wide cultural order chat has fallen heir to the unique civilization in which they 
were indigenous. This order and its authority are manifested in much the same way 
wherever in the world there are the educational institutions that appear to be necessary 
for the maintenance of the science and technology on which the economic fabric of our 
world depends. 
We are so used to the worldwide hegemony of a single body of high art practice, with 
a sharply distinctive and historically conditioned idlenticy of its own, that we tend to lose 
sight of how very odd the situation is. The oddity is comparable co that of the worldwide 
propagation of the eccentricities of the world religions. However, there is nothing odd 
about odd icy. A study of natural history is enough to remind us that the actualicies of the 
world we live in are nothing if not weird. Things have happened as they happen co have 
happened as a result of the forces that happened to impinge and prevail, and resist further 
explication. But in addition to chis oddity two other things need to be noted: first, that 
the compelling power of beauty is experienced as inhering in the actual objects chosen 
by whatever process it is, so that the prestige of what has prestige seems self-evidently 
self-justifying; and second, that the art institutionalized in the super-imperial interna· 
tional order has no effectual rival. 
In its freedom from effective competition, this high art has inherited the authoricy 
claimed by the 1 8th-century European Enlightenment, of which the project was 
precisely to substitute defensible standards for mere local preferences in all areas of 
culcural and spiritual activity. The Enlightenment as it conceived itself admitted no 
competitor or rival, because to accept the very idea of such rivalry was to concede that 
there was a competition, and to be in a competition is to accept that there are standards 
of success; and it was this acceptance itself chat was the central theme of the Enlighten­
ment. In principle, the Enlightenment was to be the hegemony of reason, the first and 
only fully self-correcting system of theory and taste. 
What aesthetics and the philosophy of an relied on was the very intelligibility of this 
idea. It never mattered how many mistakes were made, how many crazy projects formed 
and :abandoned. What mattered was that mistakes were misr.akes. In principle, mistakes 
can always be discovered, and when they are discovered they can be corrected. As for 
the oddness and arbitrariness of the cultural phenomena and preferences chat actually 
flourished as the art of chis paramount civilization, that did not matter either,. insofar as 
the educational system remained integral and, within ic, prowess could be achieved and 
the compelling power of beauty could actually be experienced, in appropriate ways on 
appropriate occasions, by those whom the education adequately prepared. 
IV 
A suitable title for what I have said so far would have been " Aesthetics and Empire." 
Bue I actually called it " Aesthetics and the End of Civilization." At the very moment of 
their decisive triumph, the high arts of the imperially dominant civilization and the 
entrenched educ.aitional system that supports them, are being called into question. More 
seriously, the idea of civilization itself is losing its hold on us. le is being challenged on 8
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many sides, and simply vanishing from sight on others; and when that idea goes the 
justifying mission of aestnetics, and aesthetics itself as we have known it, go with it. 
We all know that the pretended universality of the overarching civilization itself, with 
its educational support system, is widely perceived to be a sham, at best contaminated 
by and at worst a mask. for the diverse systems of oppression that Marxists, feminists, 
spo�espeople for indigenous minorities, and other agents of demystification have laid 
embarrassingly bare. What is beginning to rna�e the very idea of civilization generally 
invisible, or even unintelligible, is something quite different. It involves the rise to 
dominance of the electronic media, with their cendency to eliminate structure. It is 
through the electronic media that the public world nowadays reaches us in the first 
instance, and th05e media, especially television, work th.rough a democracy of appear­
ances. Everything that appears through them is necessarily shown as equally present, 
immediate and actual-just as a photograph taken by an inexperienced or incautious 
photographer cums out to be a picture, not of what interested the photographer, but 
indifferently of everything with.in the photo frame. A judicial verdict in a criminal case 
looks and sounds on television no different from a mere expression of arbitrary opinion; 
structure and hierarchy may be asserted, but the assertion remains just an assertion 
alongside the data to which it relates, and may always be countered by a denial; and the 
denial, because it is equally audible and visible, nas equal weight. And these destructuring 
media are necessarily coextensive with the advanced technology which gives the 
international super ,empire of the world educational system its effective edge. 
An exemplary event took place in 1987 at Stanford University. It was proposed to 
eliminate the introductory course in "Wes tern Civilization," wruch was compulsory for 
first,year students, in favour of a course in "Culture, Ideas, and Values." To quote a 
recent advocate of this reform, "the aim of CIV [the proposed new course] was, and is, 
to broaden the concept of wha.t constitutes 'valid' intellectual history by including non, 
Wes tern as well as Wes tern perspectives on culture, society, history, literature and so on. 
Such a change necessarily involves a challenge to the formerly unquestioned dominance 
of the predominantly white, male, upper,class contributors to the Western intellectual 
tradition."10 The advocate, we observe, does not cnallenge the old course's interpreta­
tion of western civilization, but ignores it altogether. A course on the basics of the 
worldwide educational and cultural structure, the structure on wruch Stanford Univer­
sity depends for its meaningful existence, and without wruch the audience the advocate 
is addressing could not exist, is to be jettisoned in favour of a mass of material whose only 
stated merit is that it has no structural connection with that system. What this advocacy 
represents is the world of disconnected appearances that the electronic media present, 
not the practical world in whlch policies can be framed and put into effect. 
The advocates of the new Stanford program could have mounted a critique free of this 
terrifying insouciance, and I have no doubt that in the deliberative bodies concerned 
they did. Mere historical association with the educational and cultural system by whlch 
science and the intellectual world are sustained nas no doubt lent a spurious authority 
to pernicious prejudices and socially injurious judgments such as the advocate I quoted 
nas in the forefront of his mind. The new course may well be more valuable to its victims 
than the old, and I nave no answer for the historians who point out the dubious origins 
of such ideological indoctrination.11 What is disconcerting in this particular piece of 
advocacy is the absence of any suspicion that there might be such a th.ing as a civilization, 
outside of which the fonnation of the advocate and the tenns of his advocacy are 
unthinkable. 12 
The sense of a civilization that articulates the public world of thought and culture has, 
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ic seems. been undermined. But even where irs exisrence is recognized the superimpcrial 
civilization is mer \\<ith a hostiliry that is accompanied by, and to some extenr based on, 
a rejection of the idea of enlightenment and the older idea of civilization itself. 
What is thus rejecred, more or less articulately, is what is perceived as a misdirected 
holism and a spurious universalism. The idea of a universal research-based science is 
repudiated in favour of an empirical wisdom to be based directly on life as experienced 
by those who live it, with the accretions of their local lore; intrusive ecological and 
medical engineering, aimed at specific results and effects without regard to their eventual 
overall outcome, are denounced in the name of skills and remedies discovered and used 
within a familiar working context. The underlying perception is that planned and 
researched order, on a scale that goes beyond the control of a face-tcrface community, 
simply generates a more widespread disorder; and this disorder cannot be controlled or 
mitigated, because it could be counteracted only by an even more massive and hence 
necessarily more destructive intrusion. So the very idea of a worldwide civilization within 
which humanity remodels itself into the truly rational animal through a universal 
science-based education�verything from Socrates to UNESCO, in fact-is repudi­
ated as inevitably leading to something that, ironically, only our new world-wide 
information networks enable us co foresee: irreversible, world.wide, demographic and 
ecological disaster., The few humans who live through the incipient catastrophe, if any 
do, will have to return to something like the conditions of the Bronze Age, or construct 
some new social order of comparable modesty. Meanwhile, uenlightenmenc" has become 
a term of abuse, standing for the intrusion of heartless reasoning into areas where 
observant and sensitive experience should be our only guides. 
With the dissolution of the idea of civilization must also disappear the idea of high art, 
the unique symbolic order of imaginative achievement; and when the idea of high art 
loses its authority aesthetics as a discipline loses its original reason for being. That has 
no practical consequences for university professors of aesthetics or their students, of 
course, because aesthetics is no less integral to the universal educational order than the 
fine arts themselves, so that its institutional identity and its principal subject maner 
stand or fall together. The discipline of aesthetics exists only so long as the educational 
order exists, and while that order exists the high arts are sustained. All that has changed 
is the authority of the order co which the fine arts belong and, hence, the claim of 
aesthetics as we have known irt to an important place in the ideal order of humane 
learning and inquiry. 
As the idea of civilization and the concomitant idea of high art lose their hold, we can 
expect aesthetics to be effectively displaced by other disciplines or modes of discourse. 
And so it has been. One of these successors is semiotics, the general study of systems of 
codes and variously language· like systems of meaning by which human culture and the 
interactions of social animals are articulated. To this study, it is unimportant whether the 
phenomena under study pertain to art or to authoritative hegemonies of practice or not. 
Another mode of postaesthetic discourse is what goes under the name of deconstruction, 
a set of strategic approaches designed to destroy the oppressive authority of systems of 
thought and practice by unravelling them at the edges, showing how they necessarily fail 
to possess the autonomy on which they rely, and thereby allowing full scope to the 
indeterminate ways in which living intelligences actually move. A third mode of 
discourse, overlapping these, is what is called "literary theory" or simply 11theory1" which 
is based on the realization that when the hegemony of supposedly authoritative systems 
is broken the way is open for the free play of interpretative systems that need no further 
justification than tlhe light they are felt to shed on a certain range of phenomena. 
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Of course, these fashionable modes of discourse, and others like them, flounsh only 
within the educational establishment and have no audience outside it, and one becomes 
tired of repeating that deconstruction would lose its edge if there were no powerful and 
persuasive structures to direct n against. But flourish they do, and they do so because of 
a genuine loss of inner conviction in the sorts of structure thac art and civilization 
represent. And it is time we reminded ourselves how deeply this loss of conviction is 
involved with the basic critique of feminism, the suggestion that the idea of civilization 
with all its interlocbng hierarchies, including arts organizations and the international 
educational system on which civilization most directly depends, does not after all 
represent the best hope for humanity. le stands rather for the drives to domination and 
competition proper only to the behavior patterns of idle masculinity, to be stripped of 
privilege if not destroyed as the feminine half of humanity regains the fulfilment of which 
it has so long been deprived. 
Are we co conclude from all this that aesthetics today is at the worst a dead duck, or, 
at the best, flapping like Minerva's owl through a deepening twilight? Hardly. Aesthetics 
remains an integral part of philosophy, and philosophy is not to be identified with its 
fashions. Whatever professional departments of philosophy may or may not be doing, 
philosophy is defined by the breadth of its scope and the depth of its critique, simply 
because any mode of inquiry that established a broader scope or a greater penetration 
would ipso facto be recognized as philosophy; it is the function of the concept of 
philosophy to ensure precisely that. Philosophy must include within its scope the 
recognizable domains of human value and the distinctive deployments of human reason; 
neither the compelling power of aesthetic value nor the free development of the 
resources of imaginative creation and communication can be eliminated from the map 
of mind, and aesthetics as the critique and explication of that domain of thought 
therefore cannot be eliminated either - though it certainly may be neglected, or 
cultivated trivially or ineffectively. Aesthetics may indeed owe its institutional viability, 
with its familiar forms and preoccupations, to the ideologies of civilization and high art 
as well as to the super-imperial educational hegemony of the university world; but it does 
not depend on them for the validation of its inquiries. The compelling force of beauty 
retains all the power it ever had; the traditions and disciplines, of the fine arts and their 
ancillary practices continue to absorb all the devotion and skill they ever did, and are, 
as indisputably as ever, a distinctive and significant domain of human reason; and the 
changing procedures of critical discourse continue to display a logic and a rhetoric that 
call for analysis. And, to speak the truth, if we divert our attention from the sort ofloose 
talk we subject ourselves to in the academy, the institutions of civilization and art and 
education remain solidly in place, much as our distraught governments would like to cut 
them down to size. 
It is indeed at the very moment of its global triumph that the super-imperial order of 
scientific and technological civilization, together with the idea of civilization itself, is 
called into question. And this is no coincidence. It is the revelation of its power that 
makes its dangers plain. It was when its dreams were impotent that the lure of their 
fulfilment seemed irresistible. This being so, what we should look for is probably not the 
death of civilization but an unstable condition in which a universal educational and 
cultural system and its regional alternatives coexist in various conditions of rivalry and 
harmony.LI 
But after all, when we wrench our minds free from the intellectual habits we have 
formed in seminars and exammation halls and consider the actual shapes of the lives we 
live and the situations we live them in, it may strike us that "civilization" cannot 11
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meaningfully be said to die or to live. The word fails to pick out any concrete and 
substantial realicy. Meanwhile, whatever the destiny of aesthetics may be, and whatever 
may come of the world we live in1 there is no difficulty in locating a loc of specific and 
practicable projects that we can spend time on with interest and excitement, and for 
many of these projects the word "aesthetics .. continues to afford the most suitable name. 
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